Instructor: Leora Harpaz
Website: http://www.lharpaz.com
Direct Link to JASA material: http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/JASA/
Email - LHARPAZ@LHARPAZ.COM
Please use the following link if you want to make suggestions
for topics you would like covered in upcoming classes:
http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/JASA/suggestions/
Feel free to use the link as often as you want.
Spring Semester Class:
Major Legal Controversies: Past, Present, and Future
The law develops over time with past decisions serving as
precedent to influence the outcome of current controversies.
This course will examine current legal controversies as well
as ones we can anticipate will confront the courts in the
future. An important focus of this examination will be on how
the outcome of these cases is likely to be shaped by Supreme
Court precedent which the current Supreme Court will either
adhere to, distinguish, or overrule.
Class 10 - May 3
First
Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
Four
Student Speech Cases: Edited Versions -
http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/JASA/studentspeechcases.pdf
Three Tinker Students: https://img.haikudeck.com/mi/97b50cc6c5071f1e65a512afda9a0ae1.jpeg
Tinker Quotations:
1. In our system, state-operated schools may
not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials
do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect. . . . In our
system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate.
2. “The
classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’
The Nation’s
future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.’”
3. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion
may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the
views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk; and our history says that it is
this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength
and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society.
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser:
Photo of Fraser: http://studentfreespeechrights.weebly.com/bethel-school-district-v-fraser.html
Fraser's Speech: http://www.wneclaw.com/lawed/fraserspeech.html
“[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for
citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate
the habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in
the community and the nation.” In Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76 -77 (1979), we echoed the essence of
this statement of the objectives of public education
as the “inculcat[ion of] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.”
These fundamental values of “habits and manners of
civility” essential to a democratic society must, of
course, include tolerance of divergent political and
religious views, even when the views expressed may
be unpopular. But these “fundamental values” must
also take into account the sensibilities of others,
and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of
fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society’s
countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even
the most heated political discourse in a democratic
society requires consideration for the personal
sensibilities of the other participants and
audiences.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier:
Cathy Kuhlmeier: http://schema-root.org/region/americas/north_america/usa/government/branches/judicial_branch/supreme_court/decisions/schools/hazelwood_v._kuhlmeier/cathy_kuhlmeier.jpg
1. The
question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech - the question that we
addressed in Tinker - is different from the question
whether the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The
former question addresses educators' ability to silence a
student's personal expression that happens to occur on the
school premises. The latter question concerns educators'
authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school. These activities may
fairly be characterized as part of the school
curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences.
2. [W]e hold that educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.
Cake Picture - http://www.wneclaw.com/firstamendment/cake.png
Morse v. Frederick
BONG HiTS 4 JESUS Banner: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bong_Hits_for_Jesus.jpg
Banner Held Up By Students: http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photos/070316/070316_banner_hmed_6p.grid-6x2.jpg
Photo of Frederick (then) - http://www.bsalert.com/news/1715/Bong_Hits_For_Jesus_Heads_For_Supreme_Court.html
Class 9 - April 26
First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
Eighth Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Class 8 - April 19
Tandon v. Newsom
First, government regulations are not neutral and
generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, whenever they
treat any comparable secular activity more favorably
than religious exercise. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (per
curiam) (slip op., at 3–4). It is no answer that a State
treats some comparable secular businesses or other
activities as poorly as or even less favorably than the
religious exercise at issue.
Second, whether two activities are comparable for
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause must be judged
against the asserted government interest that justifies
the regulation at issue. Id., at ___ (per curiam) (slip
op., at 3) (describing secular activities treated more
favorably than religious worship that either “have
contributed to the spread of COVID–19” or “could” have
presented similar risks). Comparability is concerned
with the risks various activities pose, not the reasons
why people gather.
Third, the government has the burden to establish that
the challenged law satisfies strict scrutiny. To do so
in this context, it must do more than assert that
certain risk factors “are always present in worship, or
always absent from the other secular activities” the
government may allow. South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (statement
of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 2); id., at ___ (BARRETT,
J., concurring) (slip op., at 1). Instead, narrow
tailoring requires the government to show that measures
less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could
not address its interest in reducing the spread of
COVID. Where the government permits other activities to
proceed with precautions, it must show that the
religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those
activities even when the same precautions are applied.
Otherwise, precautions that suffice for other activities
suffice for religious exercise too. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5); South
Bay, 592 U. S., at ___ (statement of GORSUCH, J.) (slip
op., at 3).
Fourth, even if the government withdraws or modifies a
COVID restriction in the course of litigation, that does
not necessarily moot the case. And so long as a case is
not moot, litigants otherwise entitled to emergency
injunctive relief remain entitled to such relief where
the applicants “remain under a constant threat” that
government officials will use their power to reinstate
the challenged restrictions. Catholic Diocese, 592 U.
S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); see also High Plains
Harvest Church v. Polis, 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
These principles dictated the outcome in this case, as
they did in Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___
(2021).
Dissent by Justice Kagan
The First Amendment requires that a State treat
religious conduct as well as the State treats comparable
secular conduct. Sometimes finding the right secular
analogue may raise hard questions. But not today.
California limits religious gatherings in homes to three
households. If the State also limits all secular
gatherings in homes to three households, it has complied
with the First Amendment. And the State does exactly
that: It has adopted a blanket restriction on at-home
gatherings of all kinds, religious and secular alike.
California need not, as the per curiam insists, treat
at-home religious gatherings the same as hardware stores
and hair salons—and thus unlike at-home secular
gatherings, the obvious comparator here. As the per
curiam’s reliance on separate opinions and unreasoned
orders signals, the law does not require that the State
equally treat apples and watermelons.
Text of Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . .
Class 7 - April 12
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992):
In theory, at least, the waiting period is a reasonable
measure to implement the State's interest in protecting the
life of the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an undue
burden. Whether the mandatory 24-hour waiting period is
nonetheless invalid because in practice it is a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy is a
closer question. The findings of fact by the District Court
indicate that because of the distances many women must travel
to reach an abortion provider, the practical effect will often
be a delay of much more than a day because the waiting period
requires that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two
visits to the doctor. These findings are troubling in some
respects, but they do not demonstrate that the waiting period
constitutes an undue burden. We do not doubt that, as the
District Court held, the waiting period has the effect of
"increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions," but the
District Court did not conclude that the increased costs and
potential delays amount to substantial obstacles. In light of
the construction given the statute's definition of medical
emergency by the Court of Appeals, and the District Court's
findings, we cannot say that the waiting period imposes a real
health risk. Hence, on the record before us, we are not
convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue
burden.
Tandon v. Newsom
1. Indoor gatherings are completely prohibited in Tier 1
counties and limited to no more than three households in Tiers
2, 3, and 4, while outdoor gatherings are limited to no more
than three households in all tiers. By contrast, the State
allows countless other activities to take place outdoors
without any numerical limitations, from weddings and funerals
to secular cultural events and political rallies. It also
permits more than three households to congregate inside buses,
trains, universities, airports, barber shops, government
offices, movie studios, tattoo parlors, salons, and other
commercial venues. Santa Clara County, where Wong and Busch
live [2 challengers who wanted to host indoor religious
meetings], is currently in Tier 3 and thus even restaurants
and movie theatres can operate indoors at 50% capacity.
2. First, government regulations are not neutral and generally
applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause, whenever they treat any comparable
secular activity more favorably than religious exercise. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2020) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3–4). It is no answer that a
State treats some comparable secular businesses or other
activities as poorly as or even less favorably than the
religious exercise at issue.
Second, whether two activities are comparable for purposes of
the Free Exercise Clause must be judged against the asserted
government interest that justifies the regulation at issue.
Id., at ___ (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (describing secular
activities treated more favorably than religious worship that
either “have contributed to the spread of COVID–19” or “could”
have presented similar risks). Comparability is concerned with
the risks various activities pose, not the reasons why people
gather.
Third, the government has the burden to establish that the
challenged law satisfies strict scrutiny. To do so in this
context, it must do more than assert that certain risk factors
“are always present in worship, or always absent from the
other secular activities” the government may allow. South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021)
(statement of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 2); id., at ___
(BARRETT, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1). Instead, narrow
tailoring requires the government to show that measures less
restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address
its interest in reducing the spread of COVID. Where the
government permits other activities to proceed with
precautions, it must show that the religious exercise at issue
is more dangerous than those activities even when the same
precautions are applied. Otherwise, precautions that suffice
for other activities suffice for religious exercise too. Roman
Catholic Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5);
South Bay, 592 U. S., at ___ (statement of GORSUCH, J.) (slip
op., at 3).
Fourth, even if the government withdraws or modifies a COVID
restriction in the course of litigation, that does not
necessarily moot the case. And so long as a case is not moot,
litigants otherwise entitled to emergency injunctive relief
remain entitled to such relief where the applicants “remain
under a constant threat” that government officials will use
their power to reinstate the challenged restrictions. Catholic
Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); see also High
Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
These principles dictated the outcome in this case, as they
did in Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___
(2021).
Dissent by Justice Kagan
The First Amendment requires that a State treat religious
conduct as well as the State treats comparable secular
conduct. Sometimes finding the right secular analogue may
raise hard questions. But not today. California limits
religious gatherings in homes to three households. If the
State also limits all secular gatherings in homes to three
households, it has complied with the First Amendment. And the
State does exactly that: It has adopted a blanket restriction
on at-home gatherings of all kinds, religious and secular
alike. California need not, as the per curiam insists, treat
at-home religious gatherings the same as hardware stores and
hair salons—and thus unlike at-home secular gatherings, the
obvious comparator here. As the per curiam’s reliance on
separate opinions and unreasoned orders signals, the law does
not require that the State equally treat apples and
watermelons.
Class 6 - April 5
New York Times v. Sullivan:
1. The question is whether it forfeits that protection
by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by
its alleged defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an
exception for any test of truth -- whether administered
by judges, juries, or administrative officials -- and
especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on
the speaker. The constitutional protection does not turn
upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the
ideas and beliefs which are offered."
2. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the "breathing space" that they
"need . . . to survive. . ."
3. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.
Class 5 - Mar. 22
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or "fighting" words — those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality. ‘Resort to epithets or
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and
its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under
that instrument.’”
New York Times v. Sullivan:
1. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the
falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception
for any test of truth -- whether administered by judges,
juries, or administrative officials -- and especially one that
puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. The
constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which
are offered."
2. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the "breathing space" that they "need . . . to survive. .
."
3. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Class 4 - Mar. 15
Full Text of Freedom of Information Act - https://foia.wiki/wiki/Text_of_the_FOIA
FOIA Exemptions:
Section 552(b)
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
Section 552(b)(1)
(1)
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order;
Section 552(b)(2)
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency;
Section 552(b)(3)
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title), if that statute--
(A)
(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or
(ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers
to particular types of matters to be withheld; and
(B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act
of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.
Section 552(b)(4)
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
Section 552(b)(5)
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency, provided that the deliberative
process privilege shall not apply to records created 25 years
or more before the date on which the records were requested;
Section 552(b)(6)
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy;
Section 552(b)(7)
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings,
(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication,
(C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,
(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency
or authority or any private institution which furnished
information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a
record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of
the law, or
(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual;
Section 552(b)(8)
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of
an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; or
Section 552(b)(9)
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided
to any person requesting such record after deletion of the
portions which are exempt under this subsection. The amount of
information deleted, and the exemption under which the deletion
is made, shall be indicated on the released portion of the
record, unless including that indication would harm an interest
protected by the exemption in this subsection under which the
deletion is made. If technically feasible, the amount of the
information deleted, and the exemption under which the deletion
is made, shall be indicated at the place in the record where
such deletion is made.
15th
Amendment
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
Section 2
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
Voting Rights Act:
Section 2
a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
Class 3 - Mar. 8
Art. IV, Sec. 3:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17: Congress has the power
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;
H.R.51 - the Washington, D.C. Admission Act:
SEC. 111. TERRITORY AND BOUNDARIES.
(a) In General.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the
State shall consist of all of the territory of the District of
Columbia as of the date of the enactment of this Act, subject
to the results of the metes and bounds survey conducted under
subsection (c).
(b) Exclusion Of Portion Remaining As Seat Of Government Of
United States.—The territory of the State shall not include
the area described in section 112, which shall be known as the
“Capital” and shall serve as the seat of the Government of the
United States, as provided in clause 17 of section 8 of
article I of the Constitution of the United States.
(c) Metes And Bounds Survey.—Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President (in consultation with the Chair of the National
Capital Planning Commission) shall conduct a metes and bounds
survey of the Capital, as described in section 112(b).
SEC. 112. DESCRIPTION OF CAPITAL.
(a) In General.—Subject to subsection (c), upon the admission
of the State into the Union, the Capital shall consist of the
property described in subsection (b) and shall include the
principal Federal monuments, the White House, the Capitol
Building, the United States Supreme Court Building, and the
Federal executive, legislative, and judicial office buildings
located adjacent to the Mall and the Capitol Building (as such
terms are used in section 8501(a) of title 40, United States
Code).
The Elections Clause
- Art. I, Sec. IV, Clause
1:
The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but
Congress may at any time make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the
Place of choosing Senators.
15th Amendment
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
14th
Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. . . .
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Link to Original Text of Voting Rights Act: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/voting_rights_1965.asp
Class 2 - Mar. 1
Equal
Protection Standards
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . .
.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Feb. 22
Constitutional Provisions
Concerning Impeachment
Art I, Section 2:
The House of Representatives shall choose
their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.
Article II, Section 4:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they
shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but
the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.
Impeachment Resolution
Resolution
impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the
United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.
Resolved, the Donald John Trump, President of the
United States, is impeached for high crimes and
misdemeanors and that the following article of
impeachment be exhibited to the United States
Senate:
Article of impeachment exhibited by the House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
the name of itself and of the people of the United
States of America, against Donald John Trump,
President of the United States of America, in
maintenance and support of its impeachment against
him for high crimes and misdemeanors.
ARTICLE 1: INCITEMENT OF INSURRECTION
The Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives "shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment" and that the President "shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment, for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." Further, section 3
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
prohibits any person who has "engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against" the United
States from "hold[ing] and office ... under
the United States.' In his conduct while
President of the United States — and in
violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
to execute the office of President of the United
States and, to the best of his ability,
preserve, provide, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States and in
violation of his constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed —
Donald John Trump engaged in high Crimes and
Misdemeanors by inciting violence against the
Government of the United States, in that:
On January 6, 2021, pursuant to the 12th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, the Vice President of the United States,
the House of Representatives, and the Senate met
at the United States Capitol for a Joint Session
of Congress to count the votes of the Electoral
College. In the months preceding the Joint
Session, President Trump repeatedly issued false
statements asserting that the Presidential
election results were the product of widespread
fraud and should not be accepted by the American
people or certified by State or Federal
officials. Shortly before the Joint Session
commenced, President Trump, addressed a crowd at
the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. There, he
reiterated false claims that "we won this
election, and we won it by a landslide." He also
willfully made statements that, in context,
encouraged — and foreseeably resulted in —
lawless action at the Capitol, such as: "if you
don't fight like hell you're not going to have a
country anymore." Thus incited by President
Trump, members of the crowd he had addressed, in
an attempt to, among other objectives, interfere
with the Joint Session's solemn constitutional
duty to certify the results of the 2020
Presidential election, unlawfully breached and
vandalized the Capitol, injured and killed law
enforcement personnel, menaced Members of
Congress, the Vice President, and Congressional
personnel, and engaged in other violent, deadly,
destructive and seditious acts.
President Trump's conduct on January 6, 2021,
followed his prior efforts to subvert and
obstruct the certification of the results of the
2020 Presidential election. Those prior efforts
included a phone call on January 2, 2021, during
which President Trump urged the secretary of
state of Georgia, Brad Raffensperger, to "find"
enough votes to overturn the Georgia
Presidential election results and threatened
Secretary Raffensperger if he failed to do so.
In all this, President Trump gravely endangered
the security of the United States and its
institutions of Government. He threatened the
integrity of the democratic system, interfered
with the peaceful transition of power, and
imperiled a coequal branch of Government. He
thereby betrayed his trust as President, to the
manifest injury of the people of the United
States.
Wherefore, Donald John Trump, by such
conduct, has demonstrated that he will remain
a threat to national security, democracy, and
the Constitution if allowed to remain in
office, and has acted in a manner grossly
incompatible with self-governance and the rule
of law. Donald John Trump thus warrants
impeachment and trial, removal from office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honor, trust, or profit under the
United States.
Link to Transcript of Trump's Speech on
January 6th: https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/08/politics/trump-january-6-speech-transcript/index.html
End of the Speech:
Our brightest days are before us. Our greatest
achievements, still away.
I think one of our great achievements will be
election security. Because nobody until I came
along had any idea how corrupt our elections
were.
And again, most people would stand there at 9
o’clock in the evening and say I want to thank
you very much, and they go off to some other
life. But I said something’s wrong here,
something is really wrong, can have happened.
And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you
don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to
have a country anymore.
Our exciting adventures and boldest endeavors
have not yet begun. My fellow Americans, for
our movement, for our children, and for our
beloved country.
And I say this despite all that’s happened.
The best is yet to come.
So we’re going to, we’re going to walk down
Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania
Avenue. And we’re going to the Capitol, and
we’re going to try and give.
The Democrats are hopeless, they never vote
for anything. Not even one vote. But we’re
going to try and give our Republicans, the
weak ones because the strong ones don’t need
any of our help. We’re going to try and give
them the kind of pride and boldness that they
need to take back our country.
So let’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.
I want to thank you all. God bless you and God
Bless America.
Thank you all for being here. This is
incredible. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3:
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice-President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any state, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof.
NAACP complaint in Thompson v. Trump - https://naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Thompson-v.-Trump-Complaint-FILED.pdf
42 U.S. Code § 1985. Conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights:
(1) Preventing officer from performing
duties
If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire to prevent, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any person from
accepting or holding any office, trust,
or place of confidence under the United
States, or from discharging any duties
thereof; or to induce by like means any
officer of the United States to leave
any State, district, or place, where his
duties as an officer are required to be
performed, or to injure him in his
person or property on account of his
lawful discharge of the duties of his
office, or while engaged in the lawful
discharge thereof, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt,
hinder, or impede him in the discharge
of his official duties;
42
U.S. Code § 1986. Action for
neglect to prevent:
Every person who, having
knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done,
and mentioned in section
1985 of this title, are
about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or
aid in preventing the
commission of the same,
neglects or refuses so to
do, if such wrongful act be
committed, shall be liable
to the party injured, or his
legal representatives, for
all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such
person by reasonable
diligence could have
prevented; and such damages
may be recovered in an
action on the case; and any
number of persons guilty of
such wrongful neglect or
refusal may be joined as
defendants in the action;
and if the death of any
party be caused by any such
wrongful act and neglect,
the legal representatives of
the deceased shall have such
action therefor, and may
recover not exceeding $5,000
damages therein, for the
benefit of the widow of the
deceased, if there be one,
and if there be no widow,
then for the benefit of the
next of kin of the deceased.
But no action under the
provisions of this section
shall be sustained which is
not commenced within one
year after the cause of
action has accrued.