Quotations

Age

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976)

"Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. A suspect class is one 'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 -153, n. 4 (1938), in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny."

Vance v. Bradley (1979)

1. "The District Court and the parties are in agreement that whether § 632 violates equal protection should be determined under the standard stated in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976), and similar cases; and thus that the section is valid if it is 'rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.'

In arguing that § 632 easily satisfies this standard, the appellants submit that one of their legitimate and substantial goals is to recruit and train and to assure the professional competence, as well as the mental and physical reliability, of the corps of public servants who hold positions critical to our foreign relations, who more often than not serve overseas, frequently under difficult and demanding conditions, and who must be ready for such assignments at any time. Neither the District Court nor appellees dispute the validity of this goal.

The appellants also submit that compulsory retirement at age 60 furthers this end in two principal ways: first, as an integral part of the personnel policies of the Service designed to create predictable promotion opportunities and, thus spur morale and stimulate superior performance in the ranks; second, by removing from the Service those who are sufficiently old that they may be less equipped or less ready than younger persons to face the rigors of overseas duty in the Foreign Service. The District Court rejected each of these latter submissions, and, in our view, erred in each instance."

2. "Even if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that, in a case like this, 'perfection is by no means required.' The provision 'does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety. . . .' If increasing age brings with it increasing susceptibility to physical difficulties, as the District Court was apparently willing to assume, the fact that individual Foreign Service employees may be able to perform past age 60 does not invalidate § 632 any more than did the similar truth undercut compulsory retirement at age 50 for uniformed state police in Murgia. Because Congress desired to maintain the competence of the Foreign Service, the mandatory retirement age of 60 rationally furthers its legitimate objective, and it makes no difference that some Foreign Service personnel may not be subject to the rigors of overseas service or that some Civil Service employees serve in various hardship positions in foreign lands."

Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991)

1. "The people of Missouri have a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding tasks that judges must perform. It is an unfortunate fact of life that physical and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age. See Bradley, supra, at 440 U. S. 111-112; Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 315. The people may therefore wish to replace some older judges. Voluntary retirement will not always be sufficient. Nor may impeachment -- with its public humiliation and elaborate procedural machinery -- serve acceptably the goal of a fully functioning judiciary. See Mo.Const., Art. VII, §§ 1-3.

The election process may also be inadequate. Whereas the electorate would be expected to discover if their governor or state legislator were not performing adequately and vote the official out of office, the same may not be true of judges. . .  . The people of Missouri rationally could conclude that retention elections -- in which state judges run unopposed at relatively long intervals -- do not serve as an adequate check on judges whose performance is deficient. Mandatory retirement is a reasonable response to this dilemma."

2."The Missouri mandatory retirement provision, like all legal classifications, is founded on a generalization. It is far from true that all judges suffer significant deterioration in performance at age 70. It is probably not true that most do. It may not be true at all. But a State 'does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.'

In an equal protection case of this type . . . those challenging the . . . judgment [of the people] must convince the court that the . . . facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the . . . decisionmaker.' The people of Missouri rationally could conclude that the threat of deterioration at age 70 is sufficiently great, and the alternatives for removal sufficiently inadequate, that they will require all judges to step aside at age 70. This classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause."

Disability

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center (1985)

Opinion of Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part

"[T]he Court's heightened scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given that Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called ‘second order’ rational basis review, rather than ‘heightened scrutiny.’ But however labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational basis test [of earlier cases]."

Wealth

Griffin v. Illinois (1956)

"In criminal trials, a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly, the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence, and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."