SUNDAYS AT JASA FALL 2024 SEMESTER
The Supreme Court: When Law and Politics Collide
Mondays at 10:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.
Virtual Class on Zoom Beginning September 30
Instructor: Leora Harpaz
Email - lharpaz@lharpaz.com
Instructor Bio:
Leora Harpaz is an emeritus professor of constitutional law
at Western New England University School of Law as well as
founder of the annual Supreme Court Conference where she was
a speaker for over 25 years. Since receiving emeritus
status, she has been an instructor in several senior learner
programs and taught undergraduate law courses in the
political science department at Hunter College. She received
her B.A. from Stony Brook University and has law degrees
from both Boston University and New York University.
Suggestions:
I welcome your suggestions for other subjects
you’d like to hear about. Please use the
following link if you would like to make
suggestions for topics you would like covered
in upcoming classes:
http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/JASA/suggestions/
Class 7 - Nov. 18, 2024
Twenty-Second Amendment, Section 1
No person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice, and no person who has held the office of
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of
a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the office of the President more than
once.
Second
Amendment:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
Title 18 U.S.C. §§
922(d)(8) and (g)(8) concern the prohibition
against disposal of firearms to, or receipt or
possession of firearms by, persons who are subject
to domestic violence protection orders. Section
922(d)(8) prohibits the knowing transfer of a
firearm to a person who is subject to a court
order that restrains the person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or
child of such intimate partner, and section
922(g)(8) prohibits the receipt or possession of a
firearm or ammunition by such a person.
18 U.S. Code § 922 - Unlawful
acts:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to
sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or
ammunition to any person knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that such person,
including as a juvenile—
. . . .
(8) is subject to a court order that restrains
such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person
or child of such intimate partner or person,
or engaging in other conduct that would place
an intimate partner in reasonable fear of
bodily injury to the partner or child, except
that this paragraph shall only apply to a
court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such
person received actual notice, and at which
such person had the opportunity to
participate; and
(B)
(i) includes a finding that such person
represents a credible threat to the physical
safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner
or child that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury
(a) It shall be unlawful
(1) for any person . . . .
(G)(8) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such
person received actual notice, and at which
such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner
of such person or child of such intimate
partner or person, or engaging in other
conduct that would place an intimate partner
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the
partner or child; and
(C) (i) includes a finding that such person
represents a credible threat to the physical
safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner
or child that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Class 6 - Nov. 11, 2024
O'Connor-Ratcliffe v. Garnier
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Standard:
“whether the public official’s conduct, even if ‘seemingly
private,’ is sufficiently related to the performance of his
or her official duties to create ‘a close nexus between the
State & the challenged action,’ or whether the public
official is instead ‘pursu[ing] private goals via private
actions.’”
Lindke v. Freed
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Standard:
Whether the official's social media activity is “(1)pursuant to an
official's actual or apparent duties or (2) if the
official is using their state authority” so that “the social media
activity is ‘fairly attributable’
to the state.”
U.S. Supreme Court Standard:
(1)Whether the public official has “actual
authority rooted in written law or
longstanding custom to speak for the state”
and “[t]hat authority . . .
extend[s] to speech of the sort that
caused the alleged rights
deprivation.”
and (2) the
official “purported to exercise
that authority in the relevant
posts.”
Class 5 - Nov. 4, 2024
No content posted for this class
Class 4 - Oct. 28, 2028
No content posted for this class
Class 3 - Oct. 21, 2024
Fischer v. United States
18 U.S.C. §1512(c):
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with
the intent to impair the object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any
official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
Class 2 - Oct. 7, 2024
Trump v. United
States
Justice Sotomayor, disenting opinion:
1. “The Court now confronts a question it has never
had to answer in the Nation’s history: Whether a
former President enjoys immunity from federal
criminal prosecution. The majority thinks he should,
and so it invents an atextual, ahistorical, and
unjustifiable immunity that puts the President above
the law. The majority makes three moves that, in
effect, completely insulate Presidents from criminal
liability. First, the majority creates absolute
immunity for the President’s exercise of ‘core
constitutional powers.’ This holding is unnecessary
on the facts of the indictment, and the majority’s
attempt to apply it to the facts expands the concept
of core powers beyond any recognizable bounds. In
any event, it is quickly eclipsed by the second
move, which is to create expansive immunity for all
‘official act[s].’ Whether described as presumptive
or absolute, under the majority’s rule, a
President’s use of any official power for any
purpose, even the most corrupt, is immune from
prosecution. . . . Finally, the majority declares
that evidence concerning acts for which the
President is immune can play no role in any criminal
prosecution against him. That holding, which will
prevent the Government from using a President’s
official acts to prove knowledge or intent in
prosecuting private offenses, is nonsensical.”
18 U.S. Code § 1512(c):
Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a
record, document, or other object, or attempts
to do so, with the intent to impair the
object’s integrity or availability for use in
an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or
impedes any official proceeding, or attempts
to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both.
Class 1 - Sept. 30, 2024
14th Amendment, Section 3:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member
of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of
each House, remove such disability.
14th Amendment, Section 5:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Trump v. Anderson
Per Curiam Opinion:
1. “[F]ederal officers ‘owe their existence & functions
to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the
people,’ [and therefore] powers over their election and
qualifications must be specifically ‘delegated to, rather
than reserved by, the States.’”
2. “The ‘patchwork’ that would likely result from state
enforcement would ‘sever the direct link that the Framers
found so critical between the National Government and the
people of the United States’ as a whole. But in a
presidential election ‘the impact of the votes cast in each
State is affected by the votes cast’ -- or, in this case,
the votes not allowed to be cast -- ‘for the various
candidates in other States.’” . . . “The disruption would be
all the more acute -- and could nullify the votes of
millions and change the election result -- if Section 3
enforcement were attempted after the Nation has voted.
Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such
chaos.”
Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson, concurring in the judgment:
Today, the majority goes beyond the necessities of this case
to limit how Section 3 can bar an oathbreaking
insurrectionist from becoming President. Although we agree
that Colorado cannot enforce Section 3, we protest the
majority’s effort to use this case to define the limits of
federal enforcement of that provision. Because we would
decide only the issue before us, we concur only in the
judgment.
Trump v. United States
Justice Thomas, concurring opinion:
The Appointments Clause, Art. II, §2, cl. 2.:
“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Department.”
Justice Sotomayor, disenting opinion:
1. “Today’s decision to grant former Presidents criminal
immunity reshapes the institution of the Presidency. It
makes a mockery of the principle, foundational to our
Constitution and system of Government, that no man is above
the law. Relying on little more than its own misguided
wisdom about the need for ‘bold and unhesitating action’ by
the President, the Court gives former President Trump all
the immunity he asked for and more. Because our Constitution
does not shield a former President from answering for
criminal and treasonous acts, I dissent.”
2. “The Court now confronts a question it has never had to
answer in the Nation’s history: Whether a former President
enjoys immunity from federal criminal prosecution. The
majority thinks he should, and so it invents an atextual,
ahistorical, and unjustifiable immunity that puts the
President above the law. The majority makes three moves
that, in effect, completely insulate Presidents from
criminal liability. First, the majority creates absolute
immunity for the President’s exercise of ‘core
constitutional powers.’ This holding is unnecessary on the
facts of the indictment, and the majority’s attempt to apply
it to the facts expands the concept of core powers beyond
any recognizable bounds. In any event, it is quickly
eclipsed by the second move, which is to create expansive
immunity for all ‘official act[s].’ Whether described as
presumptive or absolute, under the majority’s rule, a
President’s use of any official power for any purpose, even
the most corrupt, is immune from prosecution. . . . Finally,
the majority declares that evidence concerning acts for
which the President is immune can play no role in any
criminal prosecution against him. That holding, which will
prevent the Government from using a President’s official
acts to prove knowledge or intent in prosecuting private
offenses, is nonsensical.”