Famous Supreme Court Decisions
Class 8 - Mar. 3, 2022
Schenck
Flyer
Schenck v. United States (1919)
1. We admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the
defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would
have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.
2. The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected
by any constitutional right.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
Brandenburg's Speech
“This
is an organizers' meeting. We have had quite a few members here
today which are -- we have hundreds, hundreds of members
throughout the State of Ohio. I can quote from a newspaper
clipping from the Columbus, Ohio, Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday
morning. The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does
any other organization. We're not a revengent organization,
but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues
to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken.”
“We
are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand
strong. From there, we are dividing into two groups, one group to
march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into
Mississippi. Thank you.”
Brandenburg
Standard
“These
later decisions have fashioned the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.”
Brandenburg
Test
The government can punish speech that advocates the use of
force or lawless action only if the speech is:
(1) advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action; and
(2) likely to incite or produce such action.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or ‘fighting’ words — those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ‘Resort
to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise
no question under that instrument.’”
West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette (1943)
“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)
1. Thus, we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials.
The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance
and protest on one of the major public issues of our time,
would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional
protection. The question is whether it forfeits that
protection by the falsity of some of its factual
statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an
exception for any test of truth -- whether administered by
judges, juries, or administrative officials -- and
especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on
the speaker. The constitutional protection does not turn
upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the
ideas and beliefs which are offered."
2. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the "breathing space" that they
"need . . . to survive."
3. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
Cohen v. California (1971)
“[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that
emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the
more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated.”
“For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated
here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre,
it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style so largely to the individual.”
Class 7 - Feb. 24, 2022
15th Amendment
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
Section 2
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966):
“Congress exercised its authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment in an inventive manner when it enacted the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. First: the measure prescribes
remedies for voting discrimination which go into effect
without any need for prior adjudication. This was
clearly a legitimate response to the problem, for which
there is ample precedent under other constitutional
provisions. Congress had found that case-by-case
litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and
persistent discrimination in voting, because of the
inordinate amount of time and energy required to
overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably
encountered in these lawsuits. . . . Second: the Act
intentionally confines these remedies to a small number
of States and political subdivisions . . . . This, too,
was a permissible method of dealing with the problem.
Congress had learned that substantial voting
discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of
the country . . . . In acceptable legislative fashion,
Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic
areas where immediate action seemed necessary. The
doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South
Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine
applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted
to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils
which have subsequently appeared.”
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. . . .
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Dollree
Mapp (mug shot)
Clarence Earl Gideon (date unknown)
Ernesto Miranda (mug shot)
Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
Class 6 - Feb. 17, 2022
Planned
Parenthood v. Casey (1992):
1. “Our cases recognize ‘the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.’ Our precedents ‘have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’ These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.”
2. “[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to
anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning
of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant
a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to
insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”
3. “A
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”
4. “As with any medical procedure, the State may enact
regulations to further the health or safety of a woman
seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue
burden on the right.”
Article I, Sec. 4:
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for . .
. Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations.”
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964):
“We hold that, construed in its historical context, the
command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen ‘by
the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as
is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election
is to be worth as much as another’s. . . . It would be
extraordinary to suggest that in such statewide elections
the votes of inhabitants of some parts of a State . . .
could be weighted at two or three times the value of the
votes of people living in more populous parts of the
State. . . . We do not believe that the Framers of the
Constitution intended to permit . . . vote-diluting
discrimination to be accomplished through the device of
districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants.
To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in
another would not only run counter to our fundamental
ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the
principle of a House of Representatives elected ‘by the
People,’ a principle tenaciously fought for and
established at the Constitutional Convention.”
Reynolds v. Sims (1964):
1. “We conclude that the Equal Protection Cl guarantees
the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in
the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of
votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just
as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors
such as race, or economic status.”
2. “The Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make
an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
population as is practicable. We realize that it is a
practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts
so that each one has an identical number of residents, or
citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision
is hardly a workable constitutional requirement. . . .
Lower courts can and assuredly will work out more concrete
and specific standards for evaluating state legislative
apportionment schemes in the context of actual litigation.
. . . Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case
basis appears to us to provide the most satisfactory means
of arriving at detailed constitutional requirements in the
area of state legislative apportionment. Thus, we proceed
to state here only a few rather general considerations
which appear to us to be relevant.
A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity
of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible,
and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory
in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid
considerations may underlie such aims. Indiscriminate
districting, without any regard for political subdivision
or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little
more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.
Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding
objective must be substantial equality of population among
the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen
in the State.”
The
Original Gerrymander
Class 5 - Feb. 10, 2022
Edited Version
of Roe v. Wade (4 pages) (PDF)
Links to the Two
Oral Arguments in Roe v. Wade
Legislative
Reform After the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire
Fifth Amendment:
“No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”
Justice
Douglas Zone of Privacy Art Competition
Roe
v. Wade (1973):
“This right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman
and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation.”
Class 4 - Feb. 3, 2022
Ollie's
Barbeque
Carrie
Buck and her Mother Emma
Older Mattress Tags
Newer
Tags
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . .
Class 3 - Jan. 27, 2022
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
42 U.S.C. §2000a (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. §2000a(b) Each of the following establishments is a
place of public accommodation within this title if its
operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation
by it is supported by State action: (1) any inn, hotel, motel,
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests, other than an establishment located within a
building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire
and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence; (2) any restaurant, cafeteria,
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility
located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any
gasoline station; (3) any motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or
entertainment; and (4) any establishment (A)(i) which is
physically located within the premises of any establishment
otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises
of which is physically located any such covered establishment and
(B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of any such covered
establishment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (c) The operations of an establishment
affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (1)
it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of
subsection (b); (2) in the case of an establishment described
in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which
it serves or gasoline or other products which it sells, has
moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment
described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), it customarily
presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or
other sources of entertainment which move in commerce, and (4) in
the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of
subsection (b), it is physically located within the premises of,
or there is physically located within its premises, an
establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the
meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section,
"commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
or communication among the several States, or between the District
of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any
territory or possession and any state or the District of Columbia,
or between points in the same State but through any other State or
the District of Columbia or a foreign country.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) The provisions of this title shall not apply
to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the
public, except to the extent that the facilities of such
establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an
establishment within the scope of subsection (b).
Heart of Atlanta Motel - https://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu/digital/collection/lane/id/5505
Heart of Atlanta Motel Swimming Pool - https://www.pinterest.com/pin/512284526355013560/
Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3 - Commerce Clause:
The Congress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes;
14th Amendment:
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. . . .
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Title VII:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . . .”
Bostock v. Clayton County
Majority Opinion by Justice Gorsuch:
Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire someone
simply for being homosexual or transgender. The answer is clear.
An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or
transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not
have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a
necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what
Title VII forbids.
Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have
anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. . .
. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason
to ignore the law’s demands. When the express terms of a statute
give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest
another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and
all persons are entitled to its benefit.
Dissent by Justice Alito:
1. There is only one word for what the Court has done today:
legislation. The document that the Court releases is in the form
of a judicial opinion interpreting a statute, but that is
deceptive.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on any of five specified grounds: “race, color,
religion, sex, [and] national origin.” Neither “sexual
orientation” nor “gender identity” appears on that list. For the
past 45 years, bills have been introduced in Congress to add
“sexual orientation” to the list, and in recent years, bills
have included “gender identity” as well. But to date, none has
passed both Houses.
2. The Court attempts to pass off its decision as the inevitable
product of the textualist school of statutory interpretation
championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one
should be fooled. The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It
sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents
is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia
excoriated––the theory that courts should “update” old statutes
so that they better reflect the current values of society.
Class 2 - Jan. 20, 2022
http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/CLL/suggestions/
Dred
and Harriet Scott
14th Amendment
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . .
.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Strauder v. West Virginia:
1. “It was designed to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are
enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the
protection of the general government, in that enjoyment,
whenever it should be denied by the States.”
2. “It ordains that . . . the law in the States shall be the
same for the black as for the white . . . and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was
primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law because of their color . . .
That the West Virginia statute respecting juries . . . is
such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor would it
be if the persons excluded by it were white men. . . .Nor if
a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic
Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with
the spirit of the amendment. The very fact that colored
people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all
right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens,
and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically
a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is
an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.”
Yick Wo v. Hopkins:
1. “Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.”
2. “No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be
resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to
the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong,
and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. The
discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. . . .”
Plessy v. Ferguson:
1. “The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but,
in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social,
as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling
of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most
common instance of this is connected with the establishment
of separate schools for white and colored children, which
has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative
power. . . .”
2. “In determining . . .reasonableness, [the state] is at
liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to
the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the
public peace and good order.”
3. “We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it. . . . The
argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome
by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to
the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two
races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races
are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals.”
4. Dissenting Opinion: “Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings
or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.”
Korematsu v. United States:
1. “It
should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”
Dissenting Opinions:
1. Justice Roberts: “it is the case of convicting a
citizen as a punishment for not submitting to
imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his
ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without
evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good
disposition towards the United States.”
2. Justice Murphy: “[E]xclusion goes over ‘the
very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into
the ugly abyss of racism.”
3. Justice Jackson: But once a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions
such an order, the Court for all time has validated
the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.
Class 1 - Jan. 13, 2022
http://www.lharpaz.com/ContinuingEd/CLL/suggestions/
Picture
of John Marshall, the 4th Chief Justice (1801-1835)
Marbury v. Madison
Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 13:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue writs of
mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages
of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding
office, under the authority of the United States.
Marbury
Conflicting Provisions
Marbury
Constitutional Provisions
Supremacy Clause, Art VI, Clause 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Marbury v. Madison Quotations:
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the
legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme
and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would
certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to
have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it
should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere
surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if such is to be
the construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give this
court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction
where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the
distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form
without substance.
McCulloch v. Maryland
Second Bank of the United States
Necessary and Property Clause, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 18:
The Congress shall have Power . . . to make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Officer thereof.”
Supremacy Clause, Art VI, Clause 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Gibbons v. Ogden
Gibbons
Graphic
Commerce Clause, Art. I, Section 8:
Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes.
Class 3
Heart of Atlanta Motel - http://www.atlantatimemachine.com/images/Heart%20of%20Atlanta%20Motel%201960%2001.jpg
Ollie's Barbecue - https://grottoazzurro.typepad.com/the_blue_grotto/images/2007/05/31/ollies_pic_2.jpg